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Abstract: The main purpose of this article is to assess the relationship between transitional 
justice and democratization in post-communist Eastern Europe since the fall of communism in 
1989. The analysis is focused on the role of lustration and the opening of communist secret police 
files in encouraging accountability and promoting the rule of law. An overview of these 
developments in the countries of the region – including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia – emphasizes the different approaches undertaken in dealing with the abuses 
and crimes committed by previous non-democratic governments. These differences are examined 
in relationship to three interrelated variables: (1) the exit mode from communism; (2) the nature 
of the communist regime; and (3) the politics of the present. The second part of the article 
provides an extensive analysis of the Romanian case, whose specificity lies in its violent and 
abrupt exit from communism. The unfinished reckoning with the past in Romania leads us to two 
main conclusions. First, the nature of communist elites and the opposition to them are of equal 
importance in understanding how the politics of the present shapes the way in which the past is 
addressed. Second, in the absence of any real possible reconciliation through public exposure – at 
least symbolically – of those involved in repression, delayed transitional justice is ineffective.  
Keywords: transitional justice; post-communism; lustration; Romania; opening of the files. 
 
      
In the last three decades, the question of a reckoning with the past has 
become intertwined with the main priorities and challenges faced by transitional 
governments. Addressing past abuses and human rights violations and ensuring 
that such acts will not occur in the future has direct implications for designing 
and consolidating democratic practices and institutions, establishing the rule of 
law, promoting a robust civil society and an engaged citizenry. Economies and 
infrastructures weakened by internal conflicts or corruption and 
mismanagement of previous oppressive regimes also need to be rebuilt. 
Transitional justice has become the catch-all term used by both academics and 
policy-makers to encompass both legal and non-legal mechanisms for 
addressing the past. The International Center for Transitional Justice includes 
the following related actions: criminal prosecutions against perpetrators 
responsible for past crimes and abuses; institutional reforms of state institutions 
directly or indirectly involved in abuses (police, military, courts);  reparatory 
measures towards compensating the victims of repression; establishment of 
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truth commissions or other bodies invested with the responsibility of 
investigating and explaining the underlying causes and the systematic patterns 
of human rights violations; victim-oriented memorialization efforts through 
public displays and education.1 
Although the origins of transitional justice is traced to the post-WWII 
period and linked to the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to 
prosecute and punish major perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide during the war, it has been only since the 1980s that the 
issue of the past was placed at the forefront of political agendas and academic 
debates. The focus of transitional justice has accordingly shifted from a 
jurisprudential and retribution-centered framework to a much broader approach 
that puts equal emphasis on reconciliation, healing and restoration. The 
worldwide third and fourth waves of democratization of the 1980s and 1990s 
have led to the appearance of many truth commissions and other forms of 
conciliatory attempts to balance the goals of retribution and restoration.2 A 
combination of criminal trials, restitution policies, vetting programs, truth 
commissions and memorializations is now sought in order to find some 
meaningful ways to avoid selective amnesia over the non-democratic past.   
The fall of the communist regimes in East-Central Europe in 1989 posed 
new challenges in the area of transitional justice arising from their unique 
historical experiences. Characterized as Soviet-type totalitarian regimes, these 
countries experienced extended periods of non-democratic rule that spanned 
more than four decades.  After a period of generalized terror exerted through 
violent gulag-style measures in the aftermath of WWII, when the region quickly 
fell under the political and military domination of the Soviet Union, cooptation 
and acquiescence became the common means of control in these countries since 
the 1960s. The mass character of the communist parties also blurred the 
distinction between rulers and ruled. Moreover, wide-scale control not only 
affected the public sphere, but also deprived citizens of any essential private 
experience. This was accomplished not only by the state apparatus (secret 
police), but also by widespread use of informers and collaborators. However, in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (with the notable exception of 
Romania) the passing of communism was peaceful and accomplished through 
negotiations between communist parties and opposition movements.3 In this 
                                                          
1
  Available at: http://www.ictj.org/about/trans-justice (accessed on 17 July 2014). For an 
extensive analysis regarding the concept of transitional justice including its history, 
methods and objectives, see Kritz (1995), Teitel (2003), Elster (2004).  
2
  The examples of the truth commissions in Argentina (1983), Chile (1990), South Africa 
(1995) was followed in the 2000s and beyond in many countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia 
and the Middle East in the aftermath of civil wars, guerilla warfare and military dictatorships. 
For cross-regional comparisons see Kritz (1995), Barahona de Brito et al. (2001), Hainer 
(2002), Teitel (2000), Roht-Ariaza & Mariezcurrena (2006), Sikkink (2011). 
3
  For the roundtables in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland see 
Elster (1996). Some of the most comprehensive analyses of the violent end of 
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context, the task of dismantling the communist parties’ hold over society – 
known as decommunization – became central to the project of structural 
transformation involving elite replacement, the establishment of the rule of law 
and a multiparty system, the reformation of the police, and the transition to 
market economy. Lustration – a form of vetting based on a wide set of legal 
measures aimed at restricting access of members and collaborators of former 
regimes to public office - was developed as necessary to achieve these goals.       
As the year 2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of European 
communist regimes, we have now an ample opportunity to reflect on some of 
the lessons to be learned from the region. In this article the following issues are 
addressed: the relationship between democratization and transitional justice; the 
role of lustration and the opening of communist secret police files in 
encouraging accountability; the difficulty in locating centers of repression and 
separating its institutional mechanisms from the everyday collaboration of 
civilians. A brief overview of the politics of memory in post-communism lays 
the groundwork for our analysis. This is followed by a presentation of the 
Romanian case. Both sections will focus on transitional justice mechanisms 
from above (lustration, opening of the files and truth commissions). Although 
our main focus of analysis is Romania, some comparative references will allow 
more general conclusions to be drawn. The very specificity of the Romanian 
case – the abrupt, sudden and violent exit from communism in December 1989 
– presents us with the advantage of examining the interplay between the nature 
of the previous regime, the exit mode and their relation to contemporary 
politics. In relationship to the latter it is particularly important to emphasize that 
although a new generation has emerged that had no direct experience of 
communism, current debates involving issues of guilt, responsibility and 
accountability continue to divide and stir passionate debates in Romania among 
politicians, intellectuals, civic associations and the general public. The argument 
pursued here is that these ongoing controversies involving conflicting accounts 
over the past illustrate not just a reaction against forgetting the past but also very 
real but unresolved disputes over legitimacy among competing political actors. 
 
     
Empirical and Theoretical Issues 
in Post-Communist Transitional Justice   
 
The initial conception of retribution against representatives of the former 
regime in post-communist Europe was based on a transition paradigm 
developed by Samuel Huntington in 1991. He argued that since the transition to 
democracy was generally peaceful “in Eastern Europe, apart from Romania and 
East Germany, the initial overall tendency was to forgive and forget” 
                                                                                                                                              
communism in Romania include Codrescu (1991), Ratesh (1991), Siani-Davies (2005), 
Petrescu (2010).      
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(Huntington 1991, 228). However, both immediate and long-term developments 
in the region defied this prediction.4 Romania and East Germany took opposite 
approaches. In 1990, East Germany adopted a lustration model that allowed 
employers to verify their employees’ previous involvement with the communist 
police (Stasi). In contrast, Romania took no legal measures at all to reveal the 
previous links of public officials with the Securitate until 1997. However, as the 
next section shows, this measure was so restrictive that it resulted in no 
screening and vetting of those responsible for past abuses.  Further, countries 
that experienced smooth transitions in 1989, either through roundtable 
negotiations between communists and opposition movements and dissidents – 
as occurred in Poland and Hungary – or through a peaceful ending dubbed as 
the “velvet revolution” as in Czechoslovakia, took divergent transitional justice 
paths. In 1991 Czechoslovakia enacted a radical lustration program seeking to 
ban former party and state security officials who acted as agents or collaborators 
of the secret police Statnǐ bezpečnost (StB) from elected or appointed positions 
in the government. However, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 resulted 
in two opposite approaches to lustration: while the Czech Republic continued 
the radical model, in Slovakia there were no consistent efforts towards 
decommunization (Nedelsky 2004).  In 1992, Bulgaria also banned former 
high-level officials from managerial positions in the banking sector and from 
institutions of higher education. The first speech of the newly elected Polish 
Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazoviescki, which stated that a “thick line” with the 
past should be drawn seemed to indicate that Poland would take a forgive-and-
forget approach. However, two years later the topic of lustration re-entered the 
public debate. In 1997, it resulted in a law that sanctioned lying about 
collaboration and thereby emphasized guilt and remorse rather than outright 
punitive action. The 1994 Hungarian model of lustration on the other hand, 
brought a novel legalistic approach to bear with a strict application of the due 
process principle as promoted by the constitutional court.   
This brief overview reflects a fair spectrum of responses in dealing with 
former perpetrators ranging from willful amnesia (Romania), to an intermediary 
or “mild lustration” model based on confession and reconciliation (Poland and 
Hungary) and a more “radical lustration” model emphasizing accusation and 
punishment (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria). Thus, policy-makers 
and scholars in the field sought after alternative and multiple determinants of 
post-communist transitional justice. Two additional variables were added to 
Huntington’s hypothesis: the nature of the communist regime (more liberal or 
                                                          
4
  For comparative regional analyses of lustration and the rule of law, see McAdams (1997); 
the German and the Polish cases are examined by Calhoun (2004, 51-132). David 
analyzes lustration as personnel change in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
(2011). Stan provides a broad comparison of transitional justice in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union (2009).  
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more repressive) and some conception of the politics of the present. The latter 
was seen in terms either of the electoral strength of former communists (Welsh 
1996), or of the existence of majority coalitions which pursued lustration as part 
of the reformation of state institutions perceived as contaminated by morally 
compromised and corrupt actors previously involved with the defunctive regime 
(Williams, Fowler & Szczerbiak 2005). However, when faced with the 
prospects of losing elections, ex-communists themselves fortuitously used 
lustration as a means to future political gain. This was true of Hungary in 1994 
and Poland in 1997, when mild screening policies were implemented in order to 
preempt more vigorous future measures by radical anti-communist opposition 
forces. At the same time, as the opening of secret police files showed, former 
dissidents or anti-communist opposition parties also had had their share of 
spies, informers and collaborators. According to Monika Nalepa, this explains 
the inconsistent and postponed application of lustrations in many post-
communist countries. She argues that “former dissidents delayed lustration 
because they feared ‘the skeletons in their own closet’” (Nalepa 2010, 12).                                 
Yet, the initial popular euphoria following 1989 proved to be short-lived. 
Serious economic problems caused by the introduction of market economies led 
to unemployment, inflation and loss of social welfare. Publics became 
disillusioned with the post-communist elites (both former communists and anti-
communist forces) as compromised by corrupt practices and scandals involving 
their prior affiliation with security services. In these circumstances, rhetoric 
about the past became highly politicized and inflamed. Interestingly though, 
demands for retroactive justice and truth-telling continued over fifteen years 
later when the alleged break with the past was symbolically legitimated by 
acceptance into the European Union. This apparent paradox was attributed to 
the fact that the euphoric post-communist liberal consensus had become 
irrelevant and the public disenchanted with both sides (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007). 
One of the most controversial attempts of using lustration as a political weapon 
involved the right-wing conservative Kaczynski government in Poland in 2006, 
when a controversial bill was initiated. The bill was overturned by the 
constitutional court, but if implemented 700,000 people could have been 
affected (Jasiewicz 2007, 31-32). In Bulgaria mild lustration (public exposure) 
gained momentum in 2010 when the Commission for the Declassification of 
State Security Archives revealed that from 1991 to 2010 half of Bulgarian 
ambassadors had been affiliated with the communist police. An unsuccessful 
attempt to introduce a lustration law in Romania in 2006 was followed by two 
other failed initiatives of the legislature in 2010 and 2012. Both times the 
Constitutional Court declared the lustration law as unconstitutional.   
These examples point towards the existence of certain problematic 
aspects of lustration. First, the potential for abuses and the inevitable 
politicization of lustration raises the question of how effective this transitional 
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justice mechanism is from the point of view of democratization. Second, the 
problem is to what extent can late lustration programs lead to positive personnel 
changes and an enhancement of democratic trust in post-communist countries. 
Natalia Letki provides a persuasive response to question of the relationship 
between democratization and lustration. Based on a comparative analysis, Letki 
weighs both the pros and the cons of lustration. Among the first, she lists the 
public interest (former nomenklatura represents bad social capital) and the 
importance of “ritual purification” to establish trust in the new regime. The 
negative effects lie in the incompatible relation between the exclusion of some 
on the basis of the incomplete and unreliable secret police files and democracy 
(Letki 2002, 540-545). Yet, taking into account the positive effect on reforming 
state institutions by promoting accountability as state assets are privatized, it 
seems that ultimately the advantages of lustration programs outweigh their 
shortcomings. Williams, Fowler and Szczerbiak take a less optimistic stand in 
this matter. They emphasize that an equally powerful motivation for pursuing 
programs seeking the vetting or disqualification of tainted officials is the direct 
result of present political maneuvering. They point to the particular electoral 
circumstances of post-communism that involve a fluid party system and the 
need for legislative alliances (Williams et al. 2005, 39).  However, as Cynthia 
Horne shows, when implemented in relation to other legal measures such as 
anti-corruption policies, lustration can further the democratization process 
(Horne 2009). Her analysis of late lustration programs in 2006 in Poland and 
Romania suggests that since these policies moved beyond the political elites and 
attempted to target professionals placed in positions of public trust such as 
business leaders, journalists and academics, there is a potential for a positive 
outcome in the area of public trust and confidence. Horne’s framework is useful 
in bringing a broader understanding of reckoning with the past in relationship to 
both short-term and long-term processes of democratic consolidation.  
The interplay between past and present in shaping specific country 
responses in relation to the politics of memory seems to allow the development 
of an adequate framework for both case studies and cross-regional comparisons. 
The challenge, however, is to identify the factors that explain the complex and 
fluid relationship between the ex-communists and the opposition under 
communism during the events of 1989 and beyond. Lavinia Stan proposes a 
multivariate model that encompasses the experiences of countries from the 
former Soviet Union, the Balkans and Central Europe. She argues that the post-
1989 electoral competition between the successors to the communist parties and 
the opposition reflects not only the recent past understood as the type of 
domination exerted by communist regimes (repression or cooptation), which 
explains the type of opposition developed both during and after communism, 
but also the pre-communist experiences of these countries with democracy (Stan 
2009, 267-268).  
POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AT 25: UNRESOLVED DILEMMAS 
 
125
At the same time, to understand post-communist lustration we also need 
to consider how each country set up independent bodies invested with managing 
the archives of the regime’s secret police and then granted (or withheld) 
individual access to the files kept on them. Granting access to these files was to 
reveal the truth about the past and to signal implementing vetting measures. 
East Germany was the first to provide extensive access to the Stasi archives in 
1990. It was followed by Hungary in 1996, Bulgaria and Poland in 1997, and 
Romania in 1999. However, as some of the files were either destroyed during 
the chaos of 1989 or were subsequently altered by the state bodies entrusted 
with their upkeep, we can only question their authenticity, completeness and 
reliability (Stan & Nedelski 2012, 1-5). In addition, the risk of blackmail and 
political manipulation has necessitated some further restrictions or privacy 
measures.       
This summary presentation of the transitional justice processes in the 
region and their interpretation by scholars in the field provides the necessary 
background for analyzing the Romanian case within the post-communist 
context. Specifically, the question to be addressed is the extent to which the 
violent exit from the communist dictatorship in 1989 has significantly shaped 
the politics of memory in Romania in more specific ways. As the next section 
shows, while the nature of the communist regime and the politics of the present have 
led to similar outcomes, it is the type of transition that took place that ultimately 
explains current debates on the recent past in Romania. Although the country 
initiated a wide range of both legal and non-legal responses to the abuses and 
crimes committed by the communist regime, it has yet remained a laggard in 
terms of implementing retributive and restorative policies (Stan 2013). 
 
 
Between Remembrance and Amnesia: Romania after 1989 
 
During the last two and a half decades, the politics of memory and justice 
in Romania has been shaped by an ongoing tension between two conflicting 
responses to the past.  One approach promoted by former representatives of the 
communist regime who remained in positions of power and influence after 1989 
advocated selective forgetting. These actors attempted to manufacture a 
narrative of the December 1989 revolution as a complete break with the past. 
This myth of the revolution as the foundation of a democratic beginning 
consciously or unconsciously provided the basis for collective amnesia. Thus, 
while communism itself has been considered not worth remembering, its actual 
overthrow should have been celebrated as a symbol of heroic national action. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, this rhetoric became the bedrock of the post-
communist official narrative. In contrast, former dissidents, civil society groups, 
survivors of the Romanian gulag and pre-WWII political elites promoted the 
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idea of the “unfinished revolution.” These actors acknowledged the persisting 
influence of former members of the communist nomenklatura and the secret 
police in stalling the democratic transition and thus asked for transitional justice 
policies to complete the revolutionary process, while the surviving forces of the 
old regime indeed blocked any such measures.    
This dichotomy represents the outcome of three factors that have 
determined post-communist transitional justice policies: 1. the nature of the 
communist regime itself; 2. the form of transition to democracy; and 3. and the 
balance of power between former communist and anti-communist political 
actors during the early stages of democratization. The interaction between these 
three also shows the similarities and differences between Romania and other 
former communist countries in East and Central Europe. 
Communism in Romania underwent two distinctive phases. The first 
began in the aftermath of WWII, when communists became the dominant 
political force as a result of the massively fraudulent elections of 1946, followed 
a year later by the forced abdication of King Michael, which ushered in a 
Stalinist-style regime. Especially in the late 1940s and 1950s, nationalization of 
private ownership, forced collectivization of agriculture, and Sovietization were 
imposed by the new regime under the direct authority of Moscow and with mass 
gulag-style repression. A large network of prisons, work colonies and labor 
camps, as well as forced deportations, indiscriminately targeted a heterogeneous 
population (both in terms of social class and political affiliation) as the class 
enemy.5 A special department within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI) led 
by Gheorghe Pintilie (an agent of the Soviet secret services) was set up in 
August 1948 under the name the General Directorate of People’s Security 
(Direcţia Generală a Securităţii Poporului, DGSP, referred to as the Securitate). 
It used terror, violence, and torture against prisoners and deportees. The most 
extreme measures were employed in the Piteşti prison.6 It was not until 1964 
that the last political prisoners were released after the forced signing of 
individual agreements of collaboration with the Securitate. 
The release of political prisoners coincided with a Declaration issued the 
same year by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the leader of the communist party. This 
proclaimed independence from the Soviet Union cleared the path for an 
indigenous Romanian communism and represented the beginning of a 
nationalist-communist stage that was to reach extreme forms by the 1980s. 
After Gheorghiu Dej’s death in 1965, the new communist leader Nicolae 
Ceauşescu embarked on a brief period of apparent quasi-liberalization, which 
                                                          
5
  See Muraru et al. (2008) and Bălan (2000). According to Rusan (2007), the victims of direct 
repression included 600,000 political detainees and 200,000 administrative internees. 
6
  Here an elaborate program of reeducation through torture was aimed at transforming the 
prisoners into submissive tools of the regime. For the most comprehensive account of the 
Piteşti experiment, see Stănescu (2010). 
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ended in the early 1970s. Gradually, Ceauşescu imposed a highly dogmatic, 
oppressive and personalized rule. The regime, characterized as dynastic-
socialist or sultanistic-totalitarian, rested on three principal supports: (1) a 
communist-nationalist ideology; (2) the secret police (the Securitate); and (3) 
Ceauşescu’s family members and assorted loyalists.7 The role of the Securitate 
was crucial, and after 1978 it became directly subordinate to Ceauşescu. Its 
indiscriminate use of mostly psychological rather than physical terror allowed 
the regime to exert widespread control over the population (Deletant 1996). 
However, it is important to note that, unlike the previous decade, the Securitate 
used much more subtle ways to recruit informers and collaborators including 
blackmail, personal favors and material or non-material benefits (Albu 2008). In 
fact, after December 1989, it was revealed that while the number of the secret 
police full-time employees was not especially impressive, the number of 
informers was one for every 57 members of the population (Oprea 2003, 48). 
This is significant as it indicates that late communism was strongly dependent 
on cooptation (involving both the increasingly mass character of the communist 
parties and civilian involvement with the Securitate). As throughout post-
communist Europe, this state of affairs posed serious dilemmas both in terms of 
establishing guilt and designing adequate transitional justice measures affecting 
lustration and granting individuals access to personal Securitate files. Moreover, 
the deeply anti-communist rhetoric of the early 1990s regarding the “unfinished 
revolution,” certainly alienated and may have intimidated some of the 4 million 
members of the Romanian Communist Party that had constituted almost 20% of 
the country’s population.  
Both repression and cooptation determined the nature of the opposition 
movement. In Romania, unlike Poland, Hungary and even Czechoslovakia and 
Bulgaria, there was a significant absence of any viable opposition to the regime. 
No influential dissidents with moral credibility like Václav Havel in 
Czechoslovakia or Adam Michnik in Poland, no organized working-class 
opposition movement similar to the Polish Solidarity movement, no well-
established intellectual circle critical of the Marxist dogma as in Hungary, and 
no reformist elements within the party itself were in a position to negotiate the 
exit from communism. As a result, Romania’s overthrow of the communist 
regime was sudden, violent, and disorganized, if not indeed chaotic. According 
to Peter Siani-Davies, during the popular uprising 1,142 people lost their lives 
                                                          
7
  For the concept of dynastic socialism see Vlad Georgescu (1987) and Vladimir 
Tismăneanu (2003). The term “sultanistic cum totalitarian” was coined by Juan J. Linz 
and Alfred Stepan (1996). Both terms highlight the hybrid combination of communist-
Soviet ideology and traditional type of legitimacy employed by the Romanian communist 
regime. The nationalist-communist ideology promoted by Ceauşescu took extreme 
xenophobic tones by incorporating elements of the pre-WWII fascist rhetoric employed 
by the Iron Guard and Marshal Ion Antonescu, Hitler’s ally (Verdery 1991).   
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and more than 3,000 were wounded (Siani-Davies 2006). Thus, Romania was 
the only former communist country whose initial response to the crimes of the 
old regime was instant retribution in the form of a makeshift revolutionary 
justice. A military trial that convicted and sentenced Ceauşescu and his wife 
Elena to death was conducted in a climate of violence and uncertainty regarding 
the defeat of the old regime.8 This act invested the National Salvation Front 
(NSF) – the provisional body that took power – with a semblance of 
revolutionary legitimacy. Two other subsequent trials involving higher-echelon 
officials were also conducted in a similarly helter-skelter fashion. This swift 
retributive justice worked as a cathartic scapegoat mechanism that in fact 
resulted in delaying/preventing further inquiries into the crimes committed both 
before 1989 and during the revolution. This unquestionably established a 
distinctive tone of forgetfulness by avoiding or postponing a real debate over 
guilt and responsibility for former abuses. Instead, the new leader of the NSF, 
Ion Iliescu, appealed to national consensus and emphasized in the early 
communiqués of the NSF Council that it was the Ceauşescu clan that had 
bankrupted the country. However, thanks to their own sacrifice, Romanians could 
have enjoyed a better future under the expert guidance of the new authority.9  
On the contrary, former dissidents, representatives of pre-WWII 
historical parties, intellectuals, survivors of the armed resistance conceived of 
lustration as a necessary and fundamental continuation of the revolution (for 
many years, its symbol was Point 8 of the so-called Timişoara Declaration 
which requested the banning of communist officials and secret police 
employees from public office).10 Thus, an anti-communist post-communist 
rhetoric became a counter-force and catalyst for the construction of a new 
narrative which attacked the trend towards a complacent amnesia. In fact, anti-
communism became the unifying force of a rather heterogeneous protest 
coalition consisting of the newly reestablished historical parties, most notably, 
the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the National Peasant Christian Democratic 
Party (PNŢCD); civic groups consisting of intellectuals and former dissidents, 
such as the Civic Alliance (AC) and the Group for Social Dialogue (GDS); the 
Association of the Former Political Prisoners in Romania (AFDPR) and various 
student groups. This position influenced the actions of the opposition movement 
both in the aftermath of December 1989 and in the first democratic election of 
May 1990. The Timisoara Proclamation became the manifesto of the anti-
communist opposition during the spring 1990 demonstration in Bucharest’s 
                                                          
8
  The transcript of the trial can be downloaded at: http://ceausescu.org/ceausescu_texts/ 
revolution/trial-eng.htm (accessed on 8 July 2014).      
9
  For the texts of the NSF communiqués from 22 December and 24 December 1989, see Ion 
Iliescu (2010), 259-261 and 264-266.   
10
  For the chronology, the content and the adherents of the Timişoara Declaration, see Tudor 
& Seracin (2010, 24-44).   
POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AT 25: UNRESOLVED DILEMMAS 
 
129
University Square. After the NSF’s overwhelming victory in elections, some 
chose to continue their protest, but this ended in mid-June, when it was 
violently smashed by the authorities. The repressive response of the government 
and Iliescu’s populist attack on the opposition (which was portrayed as 
comprising fascists and pre-communist bourgeoisie) stalled any opportunity for 
reconciliation or critical-rational debate.  
During the next fifteen years, the balance of power between former 
communists and the opposition had a crucial impact on the politics of memory. 
From December 1989 until 1996, and then again between 2000 and 2004, 
former communists were the dominant political force in the country. The NSF 
renamed itself several times and became a social-democratic party that included 
former middle-ranking communist officials and their heirs. They found ardent 
supporters among the Securitate officers who went into private business and 
benefited from the privatization of state assets or retained positions of influence 
within the new structures of the secret services. Some representatives of the 
communist era who held positions of power under Gheorghiu-Dej and were 
marginalized by Ceauşescu or even engaged in dissident actions against 
Ceauşescu (including Iliescu himself) attempted to promote their own particularized 
versions of the past. These ex-communists made every effort to present both the 
positive nature of the regime (in particular its attempts at modernization) and to 
attribute its misdeeds and failures solely to Ceauşescu’s personal rule. 
Given this state of affairs, the very few transitional justice policies 
initiated before 2005 were rather minimal, symbolic and geared towards 
protecting former officials from any type of legal or non-legal accountability 
and ensuring their continuing dominance. It was only in 1997 that the 
legislature passed the Law of Access to Files and Exposure of the Securitate as 
a Political Police. It became known as the “Ticu Law” after Constantin Ticu 
Dumitrescu, the president of AFDPR, who tirelessly pursued an ongoing and 
personally dangerous battle with the heirs of the communist regime. The law 
was, however, very restrictive in scope and content and was significantly altered 
from its original version. The files remained in the custody of the same 
institutions that produced them (including the heir of the Securitate, the 
Romanian Intelligence Service–SRI), so only those files the content of which 
was defined by the holder as posing no threat to national security were made 
public. This clearly gave the ex-communists the advantage. Before the 2000 
elections, the SRI released to the National Council for the Study of the 
Securitate Archives (CNSAS) only the files of opposition candidates who were 
shown to be informers after their release from jail. This was the case of the three 
PNL leaders, Mircea Ionescu-Quintus, Alexandru Paleologu and Dan Amedeo 
Lăzărescu. In 2004, CNSAS released the results of the verifications only after 
the elections rendering it superfluous (Ursachi 2012, 310). Moreover, the media 
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had already provided by that time enough evidence to show that some were 
incomplete or simply destroyed.11  
In effect, the subordination of the justice system to the interests of the 
old/new elites inhibited, postponed and undermined the criminal trials launched 
against former officials and those individuals involved with the mechanism of 
repression before 1989. As crimes against humanity fell under a statute of 
limitations established by the communist penal code in 1969, two of the legal 
proceedings initiated by AFDPR against Alexandru Drăghici, minister of 
interior in the 1950s, and his deputy Alexandru Nicolschi failed. After 2006, 
when the Institute for the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism (IICCR) – 
a transitional justice body set up in June 2006 – filed several judicial 
proceedings against former officials, the statute of limitations prevailed again.12 
Restitution and compensatory measures for former political prisoners were 
similarly meager and geared towards providing more of a social safety net than 
legal redress.13 In contrast, the post-communist authorities granted extremely 
generous privileges and compensations to the “heroes” of the December 1989 
revolution. These restorative measures, however, served the interests of the 
post-communist oligarchy only (Palade 2011).       
In the absence of serious political will, the work of investigating the past 
was taken up by civil society groups (AFDPR, GDS and AC) and some 
segments of the media.14 The memories of those who had direct experience of 
the brutality of the early Stalinist repression or Ceauşescu’s ubiquitous secret 
police became a major avenue for truth-telling. An impressive number of 
memoirs, autobiographical accounts and oral histories were published. Perhaps 
these undertakings can be summarized in the motto used by the Sighet 
Memorial established in 1997: “When justice is unable to act as a form of 
                                                          
11
  In May 1991, former dissident and journalist Petre Mihai Băcanu provided evidence about 
the existence of buried Securitate documents near Bucharest. Historian Marius Oprea 
documented further the destruction of files and the involvement of SRI in the matter 
(Oprea 2004, 124-147).   
12
  For legal trials against former officials, see Grosescu & Ursachi (2009). 
13
  The law was published as Emergency Decree 118/1990 in Monitorul Oficial (9 April 
1990). However, given the inability of successive governments to honor the provisions of 
the decree (mainly to provide subsidized medical treatment and transportation) former 
political prisoners felt humiliated again.  
14
  Since 1990 the journal Memoria: Revista Gândirii Arestate has been publishing primary 
sources connected to the communist history. Also, TV journalist Lucia Hossu-Longin 
undertook a systematic and consistent effort of collecting testimonies from former political 
prisoners and dissidents. These were released in 2007 in the DVD collection Memorialul 
Durerii: O istorie care nu se invaţă la şcoală. Similar work was done by academics involved 
with the Institute of Oral History from Cluj, the Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism of the 
Romanian Academy, and more recently by the CNSAS Center of Oral History. 
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memory, memory alone can be a form of justice”.15 Without in any way 
minimizing the contribution of many individuals and associations in revealing 
the previously silenced or hidden history of the communist repression, we have 
to acknowledge that less interest was shown in discussing issues of 
collaborationism or acquiescence. In fact, as Cristina Petrescu and Dragoş 
Petrescu aptly put it, the past has become unilaterally and unfortunately 
represented through the exclusive lens of repression created by an alien Soviet 
occupation and symbolized in the so-called “Piteşti syndrome” (Petrescu & 
Petrescu 2010).  
A turning point that seemed to reverse the balance between forgetting and 
remembering in favor of memory was the establishment by President Traian 
Băsescu in 2006 of a Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the 
Communist Dictatorship in Romania–CPADCR (a kind of truth commission), 
which six months later released a lengthy report of almost 700 pages (CPADCR 
2007). The presentation of the report to the legislature coincided with the 
country’s accession into the European Union. The report, which declared the 
communist regime illegal, illegitimate and criminal, condemned and repudiated 
the communist dictatorship as guilty of crimes against humanity. It was 
endorsed by the president and his Democratic Party, but not by the other 
political parties in the legislature. Moreover, the report provoked virulent 
political reactions and generally poisoned the political climate. The Greater 
Romania Party (PRM) – a nationalist-xenophobic party filled with former 
Securitate elements and led by poet Corneliu Vadim Tudor (a promoter of 
Ceauşescu’s personality cult) – attacked the report on the very day of its 
presentation. This led to a serious problem after its release as many of its 
recommendations could not be put into practice. For example, Government 
Ordinance No. 16/2006 which asked for mild lustration (the removal from 
office of public servants and state dignitaries who had lied about their 
collaboration with the Securitate) could not be implemented.16 A year after its 
adoption, it was declared unconstitutional. On the positive side, however, it had 
at least two extremely important outcomes in respect to truth-telling. First, it 
provoked an open debate between various groups that had always claimed a 
place for themselves in the history of anti-communist opposition (intellectuals, 
representatives of the workers’ movements and of the anti-communist armed 
resistance). Second, as a direct consequence of giving full and unrestricted 
access to the Securitate archives for members of the commission it resulted in 
the opening of the archives and access to secret files. Following Emergency 
                                                          
15
  For the impressive work of the Sighet Memorial, see their website 
http://www.memoriasighet.ro (accessed on 9 July 2014). The memorial is in the custody 
of the Civic Academy Foundation led by well-known public intellectual and former 
dissident Ana Blandiana.    
16
  For Government Ordinance 16/2006, see Monitorul Oficial (27 February 2006).  
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Ordinance No. 10/2006 and Decision No. 60/2006 of the Supreme Council of 
National Defense (CSAT), the CNSAS archives were enlarged by 130,612 files. 
Similarly, the National Archives (ANR) substantially enriched its collection of 
party documents.    
However, this apparently positive shift was quickly stalled by political 
forces opposed to decommunization and desecretization. Under pressure from 
Dan Voiculescu, a former Securitate informer and media mogul, CNSAS was 
declared by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional in January 2008. 
However, thanks to civil society pressure, the activities of CNSAS continued 
within a new legal framework defined by Emergency Government Ordinance 
No. 24/2008. Accordingly, the role of the council was merely to determine and 
recommend the status of collaborator and informer to the judicial authorities 
and not pass judgment on any allegation of involvement with the communist 
police (Petrescu 2014). Equally strong pressure by MAI officials was directed at 
the newly appointed director of ANR who promoted the transparency of the 
archives (Ciobanu 2011, 208). Moreover, various attempts to change the restrictive 
Law No. 16/1996 governing the activity of the archives faced similar resistance. 
In 2012, following a period of intense popular unrest resulting from 
economic recession and the imposition of highly unpopular socio-economic 
measures, CNSAS came again under threat. The resignation of the incumbent 
Prime Minister Emil Boc of the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL) led President 
Băsescu to replace him with Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, former foreign minister 
and head of the Foreign Intelligence Service–SIE. However, Ungureanu’s 
government was short-lived. After a successful motion of censorship in April, 
Băsescu was left with no choice but to appoint Victor Ponta of the PSD as head 
of the executive. Immediately, the Ponta government moved to increase its 
power over state institutions provoking a political crisis. This escalated further 
when Ponta attempted to impeach President Băsescu to the point where 
prodding from the EU was needed to defend the rule of law and, with it, 
CNSAS. At the same time, the Constitutional Court overruled retroactive 
judicial legislation in two other areas: restitution and lustration. A year after the 
Law on Politically Motivated Court Sentences and Their Related Administrative 
Measures from 6 March 1945 to 22 December 1989 (Law No. 221/2009) was 
passed, the Court declared as unconstitutional that part of the law that left open 
to interpretation the level of material compensation awarded to those politically 
persecuted by the communist regime. Victims again found themselves 
potentially humiliated and subjected to further victimization by the government 
(Ciobanu 2013). In 2010, after a lustration law was voted through by the 
legislature, the Court had then declared it as unconstitutional. The principal 
objection to it, the Court claimed, was that it seeks to punish individuals for 
their ideological convictions, but not for human rights violations.17 Two years 
later, after the law was amended in accordance with the Court’s ruling, it was 
                                                          
17
  For Decision of the Constitutional Court 820/2010, see Monitorul Oficial (23 June 2010). 
POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AT 25: UNRESOLVED DILEMMAS 
 
133
again challenged by the very same court. This time the argument was that the 
previous ruling referred to the unconstitutionality of the law in its entirety 
meaning that it would then have to be reintroduced in toto and not merely 
amended.18 In the absence of any effective vetting legislation, CNSAS had 
become since 2006 quite active in disclosing involvement with the Securitate 
among office holders, business leaders, and other public figures. It is uncertain 
whether such disclosures or, as Horne calls them, “informal lustration”, would 
eventually lead to bureaucratic change.19 However, it clearly suggests ongoing 
public dissatisfaction with the political establishment and continuing mistrust of 
the performance and corrupt practices of public institutions.       
These examples illustrate that more than two decades after the fall of 
communism the battle over the past continues to divide the political and public 
space between those demanding justice and those who persists in the politics of 
forgetting. As Alexandru Gussi points out, the conflict over the meaning of the 
past is essentially the basis for the conflict respecting the legitimacy of the post-
communist state and the transitional regime (Gussi 2013). As of this writing, the 
politics of memory continues to generate strong controversies over issues of 
guilt and accountability. Since 2013, the IICCR – renamed in 2009 as the 
Institute for the Investigation of Crimes of Communism and the Memory of the 
Romanian Exile (IICCMER) – has launched another investigation of thirty-five 
people suspected of crimes committed during communism.20     
 
 
Some Conclusions 
 
This analysis provides some necessary clarification concerning the 
relations between the nature of the communist regime, the exit mode from it, 
and the politics of the present in shaping transitional justice in post-
communism. In particular, the Romanian experience shows the difficulties 
posed by the inability of divergent political actors to compromise over essential 
questions relating to the institutionalization of democracy. The sudden and 
violent exit from the communist dictatorship in December 1989, and the 
absence of a coherent and well-organized opposition movement, resulted in a 
political climate dominated by intolerance and generalized suspicion. The 
monopolization of power by unreformed ex-communists and elements of the 
Securitate in conjunction with the rhetoric of the “unfinished revolution” that 
was promoted by some segments of the opposition has shaped a confrontational 
                                                          
18
  For the Decision of the Constitutional Court 308/2012, see Monitorul Oficial (9 May 2012). 
19
  Horne sees these processes of “silent lustration” in both Romania and Bulgaria as marking 
a shift in a transitional justice approach that does not simply focus on condemning the 
past, but also seeks political change for the future (Horne 2014, in press, available at: 
http://cynthiamhorne.weebly.com/scholarship.html, accessed 7 November 2014).   
20
  “IICCMER is investigating 35 people under suspicion of having committed war crimes during 
the communist regime,” available at: http://iiccmer.ro (accessed 19 February 2013). 
MONICA CIOBANU 
 
134
and often unhealthy political competition during the first fifteen years of the 
democratic transition. In this context, various attempts at coming to terms with 
the past became deeply politicized.  The report of the Presidential Commission 
for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship and its endorsement by the 
president in December 2006 did not soften these political and societal divisions 
either. On the contrary, by stressing the negative role played by the NSF and its 
leaders after 1989 and by equating them with the communist regime, the report 
further aggravated the already existing conflict between opposing political 
actors. As shown earlier, this contest of legitimacy contestation persists and 
continues to be reproduced (at least symbolically) a generation later.  At the 
same time, the abusive and discretionary way in which the revolutionaries of 
December 1989 were compensated by post-communist authorities might well be 
compared to the meager and delayed compensation for those politically 
persecuted by the communist regime. Does this not simply compromise the idea 
of retroactive justice as embedded in the rule of law?   
We can only assume the positive potential outcomes that lustration could 
have brought for the democratic transition. Given the slow pace of democratic 
consolidation and generalized public distrust in state institutions, we ought to be 
persuaded in subscribing to the important argument that lustration promotes 
good social capital as it also makes the necessary symbolic break with the 
undemocratic past (Letki 2002). However, such a break has to be pursued in 
rational-legal terms in order to conform to any democratic politics. Given the 
specific context of the Romanian transition, it is perhaps doubtful that 
something like this could have been achieved. Yet, previous and current 
practices of administrative purges among mid-rank and appointed professional 
staff in public institutions can suggest otherwise (Stan 2013, 252-254). 
However, the inconsistent and rather discretionary access to the files (at least 
until 2000) has led to mixed results in revealing the truth. Thus, we can 
conclude that when used for political gain or altered by irreconcilable disputes, 
these transitional justice measures can all too easily fail to enhance democratization. 
In much broader terms, two main lessons can be drawn from this 
analysis. First, of equal importance in understanding how the politics of the 
present shapes addressing the past is both the nature of former elites and the 
opposition. Second, when initial transitional justice mechanisms appear to favor 
forgetting over remembering, subsequent attempts at addressing the past may 
have only very limited results.      
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